
No. 18-1514

**United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit**

Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

U.S. Department of Health And Human Services; Alex Michael Azar, II, In His Official Capacity As Secretary of Health And Human Services; U.S. Department of The Treasury; Steven T. Mnuchin, In His Official Capacity As Secretary Of The Treasury; U.S. Department of Labor; And R. Alexander Acosta, In His Official Capacity As Secretary Of Labor,
Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from a Final Judgement of the United States District Court,
District of Massachusetts

Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae

The American Civil Liberties Union, The American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, The Anti-Defamation League, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts, and the National Urban League
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal of the Decision Below

Brigitte Amiri
bamiri@aclu.org
ACLU
FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street
New York, NY
10004
(212) 519 7897

Matthew R. Segal, No. 1151872
Jessie J. Rossman, No. 1161236
msegal@aclum.org
jrossman@aclum.org
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
MASSACHUSETTS, INC
211 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 482 3170 ex 337

Kate R.Cook, No. 99103
cook@sugarmanrogers.com
SUGARMAN ROGERS
101 Merrimac Street
Boston, MA 02139
(617) 619 3480

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Local Rule 26.1, each *amicus curiae* individually certifies that it does not have a parent corporation and that no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF INTEREST.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....	2
ARGUMENT	6
I. THE HISTORICAL MOVEMENT TOWARD GREATER EQUALITY FOR WOMEN AND RACIAL MINORITIES HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A GROWING REJECTION OF RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCRIMINATION IN THE MARKETPLACE.....	6
A. Racial Discrimination	6
B. Gender Discrimination.....	13
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW APPELLANTS TO RESURRECT THE DISCREDITED NOTION THAT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS MAY TRUMP A LAW DESIGNED TO ENSURE EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIETY.....	19
CONCLUSION	25
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....	26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.....	27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Berea College v. Commonwealth,
 94 S.W. 623 (Ky. 1906), *aff'd*, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) 8

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
 461 U.S. 574 (1983) 10, 11

Bowie v. Birmingham Railway & Electric Co.,
 27 So. 1016 (Ala. 1900) 8

Bradwell v. State,
 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) 14

Brown v. Board of Education,
 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 9

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) 2

Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
 483 U.S. 327 (1987) 12

Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990) 18

EEOC v. Fremont Christian Schools,
 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) 18

EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association,
 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) 11

EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schools,
 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) 18

Frontiero v. Richardson,
 411 U.S. 677 (1973) 13, 15

Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch.,
 995 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 19

Green v. State,
 58 Ala. 190 (Ala. 1877) 7

Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc.,
680 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012).....18

State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control,
83 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1955)9

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).....12

Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57 (1961)16

International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187 (1991)17

Kinney v. Commonwealth,
71 Va. 858 (Va. 1878).....7

Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003)24

Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)11

Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
417 F. App'x 552 (7th Cir. 2011)19

Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908)15

Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721 (2003) 15, 17, 18, 22

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S.C. 1966), *aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part on
other grounds*, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), *aff'd and modified on other
grounds*, 390 U.S. 400 (1968)12

Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2594 (2016)..... 3

Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979)17

Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004)19

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)20

Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)9

Scott v. Emerson,
15 Mo. 576 (Mo. 1852)6

Scott v. State,
39 Ga. 321 (Ga. 1869).....7

Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7 (1975)17

State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (Ind. 1871)8

Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,
874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).....19

The West Chester & Philadelphia R.R. v. Miles,
55 Pa. 209 (Pa. 1867).....8

United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996)17

Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr.,
805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992).....19

Statutes

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec.
1001, § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 131-32 (2010), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-
1321

Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(3).....16

Administrative & Legislative Materials

155 Cong. Rec. S11,979 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2009)21

155 Cong. Rec. S12,019 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009)21

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Discriminatory Religious Schools and Tax Exempt Status* (1982) 9

Regulations

45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).....2

Other Authorities

Armantine M. Smith, *The History of the Woman’s Suffrage Movement in Louisiana*, 62 La. L. Rev. 509 (2002)..... 14

Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, *The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions*, 110 J. of Pol. Econ. 730 (2002)23

Colleen McNicholas et al., *The Contraceptive CHOICE Project Round Up*, 57 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 635 (Dec. 2014)24

Convention of Ministers, *An Address to Christians Throughout the World* 8 (1863).....7

Guttmacher Institute, *A Real-Time Look at the Impact of the Recession on Women’s Family Planning and Pregnancy Decisions* 5 (Sept. 2009), <http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/RecessionFP.pdf> (last visited Jan 24, 2014).....23

Guttmacher Institute, *Fact Sheet: Contraceptive Use in the United States* (Oct. 2015)24

Guttmacher Institute, *Unintended Pregnancy in the United States* (July 2015)23

Guttmacher Rep. on Pub. Policy 5, 6 (2004)23

Jeffrey Peipert et al., *Preventing Unintended Pregnancies by Providing No-Cost Contraception*.....24

John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, *A Political History of the Establishment Clause*, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279 (2001) 10

Kevin Outterson, *Tragedy and Remedy: Reparations for Disparities in Black Health*, 9 DePaul J. Health Care L. 735 (2005)..... 8

The Leadership Conference Education Fund, *Striking a Balance: Advancing Civil and Human Rights While Preserving Religious Liberty* (Jan. 2016)19

Martha J. Bailey et al., *The Opt-in Revolution? Contraception and the Gender Gap in Wages* (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper o. 17922, 2012).....23

Note, *Segregation Academies and State Action*, 82 Yale L.J. 1436 (1973)9

R. Randall Kelso, *Modern Moral Reasoning and Emerging Trends in Constitutional and Other Rights Decision-Making Around the World*, 29 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 433 (2011)..... 7, 12

Reva B. Siegel, *Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection*, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 292 (1991).....15

Reva B. Siegel, *She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family*, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 981 n.96 (2002)14

Sidney D. Watson, *Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives*, 27 Am. J.L. & Med. 203 (2001).....8

Statement about Race at BJU, Bob Jones Univ. (2016)13

Su-Ying Liang et al., *Women’s Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Dispensing Patterns for Oral Contraceptive Pills Between 1996 and 2006*.....23

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The ACLU, the ACLU of Massachusetts, the Anti-Defamation League, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts and the National Urban League are nonprofit civil rights organizations with an interest in protecting the economic and reproductive justice furthered by the guaranteed contraceptive coverage in the Affordable Care Act, as well as the religious liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution as a means to protect individual religious exercise, not as a vehicle to discriminate against others. They submit this brief with the consent of all parties.¹

INTRODUCTION

Amici submit this brief to highlight an important lesson of history: As our society has moved toward greater equality for racial minorities and women, it has increasingly and properly rejected the idea that religion can be used as a justification for discrimination in the marketplace.

At stake in this case are two interim final rules (IFRs) promulgated by the Trump administration that would broadly allow employers and universities to invoke religion or morality to block their employees' and students' access to contraceptive coverage

¹ No counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or party's counsel has contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief; and no person—other than *amici*, their members, or their counsel—contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. Fed. R. App. Proc. (29)(c)(5).

that is otherwise guaranteed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA already includes an “accommodation” for religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations that have religious objections to covering contraception, which was extended to “closely-held” for-profit companies by the Supreme Court in *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014), as well as an exemption for the group health plan of a “religious employer.” 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).

Amici file this brief in support of the Plaintiff-Appellant, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Amici agree the Plaintiff-Appellant has Article III standing to challenge the IFRs, and that the Plaintiff-Appellant has suffered an injury-in-fact. Amici offer this brief to provide the Court with a broader picture of what is at stake if the Defendants-Appellees are allowed to nullify the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that guarantee women equal access to preventive medical care—specifically contraceptive care and services.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Religion is a powerful force that shapes individual lives and influences community values. Like other belief systems, it has been used at different times and places to support change and to oppose it, to promote equality and to justify inequality. Our constitutional structure recognizes the importance of religion by protecting its free exercise, and a full range of statutes and regulations reinforce our collective commitment to religious acceptance, diversity, and pluralism. The Supreme Court in *Hobby Lobby* understood the accommodation to the contraceptive coverage requirement

of the ACA (the contraceptive rule) as a reflection of that commitment. Critically, however, the accommodation also recognizes that access to contraceptive care is an important means of ending discrimination against women in the workplace, and that the elimination of such discrimination in the marketplace is a compelling state interest.

The struggle to overcome discrimination while respecting religious liberty is a recurring challenge in our nation's history. By recounting that history in this brief, we do not question any individual or entity's religious faith or suggest that the historical invocation of religion to justify the most odious forms of racial discrimination is equivalent to the religious claims that Appellants raise on behalf of employers and universities here. But that is not the test and should not be the legal measuring rod. As recently observed in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, religious objections to anti-discrimination laws are often "based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied." 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2016).

Religious leaders—like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.—have often led the movement against discrimination. Yet, throughout our history, religion has also been used to defend discriminatory practices, to oppose evolving notions of equality, and to

seek broad exemptions to new legal norms. We can and should learn from that experience.²

From the early years of the Republic, religious beliefs were used to justify racial subordination, including the forced enslavement of African people. Far too often, those views found support in judicial decisions upholding racial segregation and anti-miscegenation laws. Even as the nation's standards evolved to prohibit racial discrimination in employment, education, marriage, and public accommodations, religious arguments continued to be used to fuel resistance to progress. In particular, Congress and the courts faced repeated calls for religious exemptions to non-discrimination standards. But, by the middle of the twentieth century, those calls were rejected by both the courts and Congress. Instead, the country came to recognize the vital state interest in ending racial discrimination in public arenas and in embracing a vision of equality that does not sanction piecemeal application of the law.

The story of women's emerging equality follows a similar pattern. Religious beliefs were invoked to justify restrictions on women's roles, including in suffrage, employment, and access to birth control. Later, religion inspired legislation purportedly designed to "protect" women, including their reproductive capacities. As attitudes changed, laws were enacted prohibiting discrimination and protecting women's ability

² This brief focuses on efforts to justify discrimination against racial minorities and women on religious grounds, but other disadvantaged and marginalized groups have shared similar experiences. *See* 16 n.8, *infra*.

to control their reproductive capacity. These measures, like those designed to promote racial equality, were met with resistance, including religiously motivated requests to avoid compliance with evolving legal standards. And, as with race, Congress and the courts have held firm to the vision embodied in newly passed anti-discrimination measures.

The contraception rule addresses a remaining vestige of sex discrimination. As the Supreme Court has recognized, women's ability to control their reproductive capacities is essential to their participation in society. Contraception is not simply a pill or a device; it is a tool, like education, essential to women's equality. Without access to contraception, women's ability to complete an education, to hold a job, to advance in a career, to care for children, or to aspire to a higher place, whatever that may be, may be significantly compromised. By establishing meaningful access to contraception for many women, the contraception rule takes a giant and long overdue step to level the playing field.

If the IFRs are upheld, employers and universities that object to providing contraceptive care on religious or moral grounds would be wholly exempt from the contraception rule leaving employees and students unable to obtain coverage through the accommodation scheme. Employers and universities need not forfeit their individual right to oppose contraceptives on religious grounds, but a personal religious objection should not be a license to disregard the law and deprive their employees and students of a critical health benefit purposefully designed to further equality.

ARGUMENT

I. THE HISTORICAL MOVEMENT TOWARD GREATER EQUALITY FOR WOMEN AND RACIAL MINORITIES HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A GROWING REJECTION OF RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCRIMINATION IN THE MARKETPLACE.

A. Racial Discrimination

There was a time in our nation's history when religion was used to justify slavery, Jim Crow laws, and bans on interracial marriage. God and "Divine Providence" were invoked to validate segregation, and, for decades, these arguments trumped secular and religious calls for equality and humanity. Eventually, due to evolving societal attitudes and the steadfast efforts of civil rights advocates, systems of enslavement and segregation were dismantled, and those who clung to religious justifications for racial discrimination were nonetheless required to obey the nation's anti-discrimination laws. Although the history of religious justification for slavery, racial discrimination, and racial segregation are different in many ways from the instant request for a religious exemption, the lessons derived from that experience are instructive.

Early in our country's history, religious beliefs were invoked to justify the most fundamental of inequalities: slavery. Indeed, courts, politicians, and clergy often invoked faith to defend slavery. The Missouri Supreme Court, in rejecting Dred Scott's claim for freedom, suggested that slavery was "the providence of God" to rescue an "unhappy race" from Africa and place them in "civilized nations." *Scott v. Emerson*, 15 Mo. 576, 587 (Mo. 1852). Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of

America, proclaimed that slavery was sanctioned by “the Bible, in both Testaments, from Genesis to Revelation.” R. Randall Kelso, *Modern Moral Reasoning and Emerging Trends in Constitutional and Other Rights Decision-Making Around the World*, 29 *Quinnipiac L. Rev.* 433, 437 (2011) (citation and quotations omitted). Christian pastors and leaders declared: “We regard abolitionism as an interference with the plans of Divine Providence.” Convention of Ministers, *An Address to Christians Throughout the World* 8 (1863), <https://archive.org/details/addresstochristi00phil> (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).

Religion was also invoked, including by the courts, to justify anti-miscegenation laws. For example, in upholding the criminal conviction of an African-American woman for cohabitating with a white man, the Georgia Supreme Court held that no law of the State could

attempt to enforce moral or social equality between the different races or citizens of the State. Such equality does not in fact exist, and never can. The God of nature made it otherwise, and no human law can produce it, and no human tribunal can enforce it.

Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 326 (Ga. 1869). In upholding the criminal conviction of an interracial couple for violation of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, the Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that, based on “the Almighty,” the two races should be kept “distinct and separate, and that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law and be subject to no evasion.” *Kinney v. Commonwealth*, 71 Va. 858, 869 (Va. 1878); *see also Green v. State*, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (Ala. 1877) (upholding conviction for interracial marriage, reasoning God

“has made the two races distinct”); *State v. Gibson*, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (Ind. 1871) (declaring right “to follow the law of races established by the Creator himself” to uphold constitutionality of conviction of a black man who married a white woman).

Similar justifications were accepted by courts to sustain segregation. In 1867, Mary E. Miles defied railroad rules by refusing to take a seat in the “colored” section of the train car. She brought suit against the railroad for physically ejecting her from the train. A jury awarded Ms. Miles five dollars. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, relying in part on “the order of Divine Providence” that dictates that the races should not mix. *The West Chester & Phila. R.R. v. Miles*, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (Pa. 1867); *see also Bowie v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co.*, 27 So. 1016, 1018-19 (Ala. 1900) (looking to reasoning from *Miles* to affirm judgment for railroad that forcibly ejected African-American woman from the “whites only” section of rail car). In 1906, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the enforcement of a law prohibiting white people and Black people from attending the same school, noting that the separation of the races was “divinely ordered.” *Berea College v. Commonwealth*, 94 S.W. 623, 626 (Ky. 1906), *aff’d*, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).³

³ Religious justifications for segregation also had a direct impact on the availability and quality of health care for African Americans. *See, e.g.,* Sidney D. Watson, *Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives*, 27 Am. J.L. & Med. 203, 211 (2001) (“Historically, most hospitals were ‘white only.’ The few hospitals that admitted Blacks strictly limited their numbers [and] segregated [the facilities and equipment]”); Kevin Outterson, *Tragedy and Remedy: Reparations for Disparities in Black Health*, 9 DePaul J. Health Care L. 735, 757 (2005) (“Many hospitals were not available to Blacks in the first half of the twentieth century.”).

These religious arguments in favor of racial segregation slowly lost currency, but not without resistance. The turning point in our country's history was marked by two events. The first was the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which repudiated the "separate but equal" doctrine established in *Plessey v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and declared racial segregation in public schools to be unconstitutional. The second was Congress's passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination in public schools, employment, and public accommodations.

The resistance to the movement for racial equality, both religiously based and other, was particularly intense in the context of education. Members of the Florida Supreme Court invoked religion to justify resistance to integration in the schools, noting that "when God created man, he allotted each race to his own continent according to color, Europe to the white man, Asia to the yellow man, Africa to the black man, and America to the red man." *State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control*, 83 So. 2d 20, 28 (Fla. 1955) (concurring opinion). Indeed, they went so far as to characterize *Brown* as advising "that God's plan was in error and must be reversed." *Id.*

In the years following the Supreme Court's enforcement of *Brown*, the number of private, often Christian, segregated schools expanded exponentially and white students left the public schools in droves. *See Note, Segregation Academies and State Action*, 82 Yale L.J. 1436, 1437-40 (1973). *See also* U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, *Discriminatory Religious Schs. and Tax Exempt Status* 1, 4-5 (1982) (recounting the massive withdrawal of

white students from public schools after *Brown* and a proliferation of private schools, many associated with churches). The schools were often open about their motives. For example, Brother Floyd Simmons, who founded the Elliston Baptist Academy in Memphis, said, “I would never have dreamed of starting a school, hadn’t it been for busing.” John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, *A Political History of the Establishment Clause*, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 334 (2001).

In response, the Treasury Department issued a ruling declaring that racially segregated schools would not be eligible for tax-exempt status. Attempts by the IRS to enforce the Treasury Department’s rule were challenged in the courts. Most notably, Bob Jones University brought suit after the IRS revoked the University’s tax exempt status based first on its policy of refusing to admit African-American students, and subsequently on its policy of refusing to admit students engaged in or advocating interracial relationships. *Bob Jones Univ. v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The sponsors of Bob Jones University “genuinely believe[d] that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage.” *Id.* at 580. Bob Jones’s lesser-known co-plaintiff, Goldsboro Christian Schools, operated a school from kindergarten through high school, which refused to admit African-American students. According to its interpretation of the Bible, “[c]ultural or biological mixing of the races [was] regarded as a violation of God’s command.” *Id.* at 583 n.6. Both schools sued under the Free Exercise Clause, arguing that the rule could not constitutionally apply to schools engaged in racial discrimination based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The Supreme Court rejected the schools’

claims, holding that the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education outweighed any burdens on religious beliefs. *Id.* at 602-04.

Progress toward racial equality was not limited to schools. Although anti-miscegenation laws eventually fell, the path to that rightful conclusion was not a smooth one. The trial court in *Loving v. Virginia* adhered to the reasoning of earlier decades: “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.” 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting trial court). But the Supreme Court expressly rejected the trial court's reasoning and declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional. *Id.* at 2.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also faced objections based on religion, all of which were ultimately rejected. Most notably, the House exempted religious employers entirely from the proscriptions of the Act. *See EEOC v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n*, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982) (recounting legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1964). However, the law, as enacted, permitted no employment discrimination based on race; it only authorized religious employers to discriminate on the basis of religion. *Id.* Later efforts to pass a blanket exemption for religious employers again failed. *Id.* at 1277.⁴

⁴ The Act, while barring race discrimination by religious organizations, respects the workings of houses of worship and also permits discrimination in favor of co-religionists in certain religiously affiliated institutions and positions. *See Corp. of the*

Religious resistance to the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not stop with its passage. The owner of a barbeque chain who was sued in 1964 for refusing to serve Black people responded by claiming that serving Black people violated his religious beliefs. The court rejected the restaurant owner’s defense, holding that the owner

has a constitutional right to espouse the religious beliefs of his own choosing, however, he does not have the absolute right to exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other citizens.

Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966), *aff’d in relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds*, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), *aff’d and modified on other grounds*, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).

Since the middle of the twentieth century, the argument that religious beliefs trump measures designed to eradicate racial discrimination—whether in toto or piecemeal—has slowly lost its force. As courts shifted to a wholesale rejection of religious justifications for racial discrimination and societal attitudes evolved, religious arguments were no longer offered in mainstream society to defend racial segregation and subordination. In fact, “no major religious or secular tradition today attempts to defend the practices of the past supporting slavery, segregation, [or] anti-miscegenation laws.” R. Randall Kelso, *Modern Moral Reasoning*, *supra*, at 439. Reflecting this

Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); *cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC*, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception).

evolution, Bob Jones University has apologized for its prior discriminatory policies, stating that by previously subscribing to a

segregationist ethos . . . we failed to accurately represent the Lord and to fulfill the commandment to love others as ourselves. For these failures we are profoundly sorry. Though no known antagonism toward minorities or expressions of racism on a personal level have ever been tolerated on our campus, we allowed institutional policies to remain in place that were racially hurtful.

See Statement about Race at BJU, Bob Jones Univ., <http://www.bju.edu/about/what-we-believe/race-statement.php> (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). Although there are many differences in the discrimination described above and the contraception rule, this history highlights the hazards of recognizing a religious exemption to a federal anti-discrimination measure that promotes a compelling governmental interest in equality and opportunity.

B. Gender Discrimination

The path to achieving women’s equality has followed a course similar to the struggle for racial equality. *See Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973) (chronicling the long history of sex discrimination in the United States).⁵ Efforts to advance women’s equality, like those furthering other civil rights, were supported—and thwarted—in the name of religion. Those who invoked God and faith as justification

⁵ The Court in *Frontiero* noted that “throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes,” emphasizing that women, like slaves, could not “hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names,” and that married women traditionally could not own property or even be legal guardians of their children. 411 U.S. at 685.

for slavery and segregation also invoked God and faith to limit women's roles. One champion of slavery in the antebellum South, George Fitzhugh, plainly stated that God gave white men dominion over "slaves, wives, and children." Armantine M. Smith, *The History of the Woman's Suffrage Movement in Louisiana*, 62 La. L. Rev. 509, 511 (2002).

Religious arguments were invoked to limit women's roles in society. And in this context, as with race, these arguments were initially embraced by courts. For example, the Supreme Court held that the State of Illinois could prohibit women from practicing law, and in his famous concurrence, Justice Bradley opined that:

The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.

Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).

This vision of women—as divinely destined for the role of wife and mother—was a prominent argument against suffrage. A leading antisuffragist, Reverend Justin D. Fulton, proclaimed: "It is patent to every one that this attempt to secure the ballot for woman is a revolt against the position and sphere assigned to woman by God himself." Reva B. Siegel, *She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family*, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 981 n.96 (2002) (quoting Rev. Justin D. Fulton, *Women vs. Ballot*, in *The True Woman: A Series of Discourses: To Which Is Added Woman vs. Ballot* 3, 5 (1869); see also *id.* at 978 (quoting Rep. Caples at the California Constitutional

Convention in 1878-79 as saying of women's suffrage: "It attacks the integrity of the family; it attacks the eternal degrees [sic] of God Almighty; it denies and repudiates the obligations of motherhood.") (internal citation and quotations omitted). It was in this same time period that the first laws against contraception were enacted to address what was characterized as "physiological sin." Reva B. Siegel, *Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection*, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 292 (1991) (quoting H.S. Pomeroy, *The Ethics of Marriage* 97 (1888); see also *id.* at 293 (quoting physician in lecture opposed to interruption of intercourse: "She sins because she shirks those responsibilities for which she was created.")).

Even as times changed, and women began entering the workforce in greater numbers, they were constrained by the longstanding and religiously imbued vision of women as mothers and wives. As the Supreme Court recognized in *Frontiero*, "[a]s a result of notions such as [those articulated in Justice Bradley's concurrence in *Bradwell*], our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes." 411 U.S. at 685.⁶ Those statutes were often upheld by the Supreme Court. For example, in *Muller v. Oregon*, the Court upheld workday limitations for women

⁶ Concomitant with a restricted vision of women's roles were constraints on the roles of men. In the idealized role, men were heads of households, the wage earners, and the actors in the polity. They were not caretakers, for example. See, e.g., *Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs*, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (recognizing that the historic "[s]tereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men"). And, for both sexes, these visions were idealized, and unrealistic for many households, particularly those of the working poor, where women as well as men labored outside the home.

because “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, [and therefore] the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.” 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908); *see also Hoyt v. Florida*, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (holding women should be exempt from mandatory jury duty service because they are “still regarded as the center of home and family life”).

But just like society’s views of race evolved, society’s views of women progressed, and gradually women’s ability to pursue goals other than, or in addition to, becoming wives and mothers was recognized. Indeed, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a step forward for race and gender equality because Title VII of the Act barred discrimination based on sex and race in the workplace. The protection against gender discrimination, like that for race, passed in the face of religious objection and without the proposed exemption that sought to permit religious organizations to engage in gender-based employment discrimination.⁷

Slowly the courts, too, began dismantling the notion that divine ordinance and the law of the Creator require women to be confined to roles as wives and mothers. For example, the Supreme Court held a state law that treated girls’ and boys’ age of majority differently for the purposes of calculating child support unconstitutional, rejecting the state’s argument that girls do not need support for as long as boys because

⁷ *But see* Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (providing an exemption for “an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of [Title IX] would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization”).

they will marry quickly and will not need a secondary education. *Stanton v. Stanton*, 421

U.S. 7 (1975). The Court reasoned:

No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. Women’s activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice.

Id. at 14-15 (internal citation omitted); *see also Orr v. Orr*, 440 U.S. 268, 279 n.9 (1979)

(holding unconstitutional a law that allowed alimony from husbands but not wives, as

“part and parcel of a larger statutory scheme which invidiously discriminated against

women, removing them from the world of work and property and ‘compensating’ them

by making their designated place ‘secure’”). Additionally, when striking a ban on the

admission of women to the Virginia Military Institute, the Court noted:

“Inherent differences” between men and women . . . remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Sex classifications . . . may not be used, as they once were . . . to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has also dismantled notions that women could be barred from certain jobs because of their reproductive capacity, *International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.*, 499 U.S. 187 (1991), and has affirmed legislation that addresses “the fault-

line between work and family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been

and remains strongest,” *Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs*, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003). The

courts and Congress have thus recognized that “denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and workers second.” *Id.* at 736 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

As with race, this progress has been tested by religious liberty defenses to the enforcement of anti-discrimination measures. Religious schools resisted the notion that women and men must receive equal compensation by invoking the belief that the “Bible clearly teaches that the husband is the head of the house, head of the wife, head of the family.” *Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church*, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392 (4th Cir. 1990). The courts rejected this claim, emphasizing a state interest of the “highest order” in remedying the outmoded belief that men should be paid more than women because of their role in society. *Id.* at 1398 (citations and quotations omitted); *see also EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch.*, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); *EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schs.*, 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (same).

Even today, laws and policies designed to protect against gender discrimination continue to face challenges in the name of religious belief, but courts have limited such arguments. *See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc.*, 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary judgment for religious school that claimed a religious right, based on its opposition to premarital sex, to fire teacher for becoming pregnant outside of marriage, holding that the school seemed “more concerned about her pregnancy and her request to take maternity leave than about her admission that she

had premarital sex”); *Ganzly v. Allen Christian Sch.*, 995 F. Supp. 340, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a religious school could not rely on its religious opposition to premarital sex as a pretext for pregnancy discrimination, noting that “it remains fundamental that religious motives may not be a mask for sex discrimination in the workplace”); *Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr.*, 805 F. Supp. 802, 808-10 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same).⁸

II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW APPELLANTS TO RESURRECT THE DISCREDITED NOTION THAT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS MAY TRUMP A LAW DESIGNED TO ENSURE EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIETY.

The contraception rule, like Title VII and other anti-discrimination measures, is a purposeful effort to address the vestiges of gender discrimination. And like those other anti-discrimination laws, this rule is being resisted in the name of religion. Appellants defend the IFRs—both in the way they were issued and their substance—on the ground that employers and universities should be entitled to evade the mandates of the law based on their religious beliefs. As discussed *supra*, the argument that religious

⁸ Attempts to use religion to discriminate are not limited to race and sex. *See, e.g.*, The Leadership Conference Education Fund, *Striking a Balance: Advancing Civil and Human Rights While Preserving Religious Liberty* (Jan. 2016), <http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/religious-liberty-report-WEB.pdf>. For example, religion has been invoked in an attempt to justify discrimination based on marital status, *see Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n*, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994), and discrimination based on sexual orientation, *see, e.g., Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004); *Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 417 F. App’x 552 (7th Cir. 2011).

belief justifies discrimination, the denial of rights, or the relinquishment of benefits is an old, discredited theory that should, once again, be rejected.

The contraception rule has, and will continue to, transform women's lives, by enabling women to decide if and when to become a parent and allowing women to make educational and employment choices that benefit themselves and their families.⁹ “By enabling [women] to reliably time and space wanted pregnancies, women's ability to obtain and effectively use contraception promotes their continued education and professional advancement, contributing to the enhanced economic stability of women and their families.” *California v. Health and Human Services, et al.*, No. 18-15144, (9th Cir. 2018), ECF No.12-2 (Excerpts of Record, hereinafter “ER”) at, 162. In a recent study, 63% of women reported that access to contraception allowed them to take better care of themselves and their family, 56% reported it allowed them to support themselves financially, 51% reported that it allowed them to stay in school or complete their education, and 50% reported that it allowed them to get or keep a job or pursue a career. *Id.* at 163. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” *Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).

⁹ Moreover, the rule is also important to protect women's health. This is particularly true for women of color who disproportionately suffer from health conditions that can be aggravated by pregnancy. *See California v. HHS, et al.*, (9th Cir. 2018) No. 18-15144, ECF No. 45, Br. of *Amici Curiae* Nat'l Women's Law Ctr.

If implemented, the IFRs would undermine the equalizing impact of the contraceptive rule and discriminate against women in at least three ways.

First, the IFRs target and single out care that women need for unique and discriminatory treatment, authorizing employers and universities to reinstate the very discrimination that Congress intended the contraception rule to address. As Senator Kirsten Gillibrand emphasized in her support of the Women’s Health Amendment (WHA),¹⁰ which authorized the contraceptive rule, “in general women of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men This fundamental inequity in the current system is dangerous and discriminatory and we must act . . .” 155 Cong. Rec. S12,019, S12,027 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009); *see also* 155 Cong. Rec. S11,979, S11,988 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (“[O]ften those things unique to women have not been included in health care reform. Today we guarantee it and we assure it and we make it affordable by dealing with copayments and deductibles”). The IFRs sanction employers and universities to harm women by cutting their benefit packages, and convey the distinct message that women are second class citizens, who can have inferior benefit packages to their male peers.

Second, the IFRs put a government stamp of approval on gender stereotypes that have been used to hold women in a place of inequality, particularly the notion, long endorsed by society, that “a woman is, and should remain the ‘center of home and

¹⁰ Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001, § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 131-32 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13).

family life.” *Hibbs*, 538 U.S. at 729 (quoting *Hoyt*, 368 U.S. at 62). The rules attack a fundamental premise underlying access to contraception, namely that society no longer demands that women either accept pregnancy or refrain from nonprocreative sex. As so eloquently stated in *Casey*, “these sacrifices [to become a mother] have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others . . . [but they] cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.” *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 852.

Finally, the IFRs are designed to burden women in a way that frustrates their ability to participate equally in the workforce, education, and civic life. When adopting the contraceptive rule, the government emphasized that the discrimination addressed by the rule was not limited to financial disparities:

Researchers have shown that access to contraception improves the social and economic status of women. Contraceptive coverage, by reducing the number of unintended and potentially unhealthy pregnancies, furthers the goal of eliminating this disparity by allowing women to achieve equal status as healthy and productive members of the job force The [federal government] aim[s] to reduce these disparities by providing women broad access to preventive services, including contraceptive services.

Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (footnote omitted); *see also supra* note 9. The IFRs will make it harder for women to access and consistently use the most effective methods of contraception. *California v. Health and Human Services, et al.*, 18-15144, (9th Cir. 2018), ER at 145. Greater access to contraceptives means fewer unintended pregnancies. *Id.* at 146-150. With greater control over their fertility, women have greater and more equal access to education, careers, career advancement, and higher wages.

Susan A. Cohen, The Broad Benefits of Investing in Sexual and Reproductive Health, 7 Guttmacher Rep. on Pub. Policy 5, 6 (2004); Martha J. Bailey et al., The Opt-in Revolution? Contraception and the Gender Gap in Wages, 19, 26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper o. 17922, 2012), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17922>; Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. of Pol. Econ. 730, 749 (2002), <https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/2624453>.

Indeed, approximately half of pregnancies are unintended. Guttmacher Institute, *Unintended Pregnancy in the United States* (July 2015), available at <http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html> (last visited Jan 24, 2014). Several facts underlie this statistic: Many women are unable to afford contraception—even with insurance—because of high co-pays or deductibles, *see generally* Su-Ying Liang et al., *Women's Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Dispensing Patterns for Oral Contraceptive Pills Between 1996 and 2006*, 83 *Contraception* 528, 531 (2011); others cannot afford to use contraception consistently, *see* Guttmacher Institute, *A Real-Time Look at the Impact of the Recession on Women's Family Planning and Pregnancy Decisions* 5 (Sept. 2009), <http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/RecessionFP.pdf> (last visited Jan 24, 2014); and costs drive women to less expensive and less effective methods, *see California v. Health and Human Services, et al.*, 18-15144, (9th Cir. 2018) ER at 152-53 (reporting that many women do not choose long-lasting contraceptive methods, such as intrauterine devices (“IUDs”), in part because of the high upfront cost).

The contraception rule lifted these barriers, with the promise of increased opportunity for women. A study in St. Louis, which essentially simulated the conditions of the rule, illustrates its impact: Physicians provided counseling and offered nearly 10,000 women contraception, of their choosing, free of cost. Jeffrey Peipert et al., *Preventing Unintended Pregnancies by Providing No-Cost Contraception*, 120 *Obstetrics & Gynecology* 1291 (2012). In this setting, 75% of the participants opted for a long-acting reversible contraceptive method, with 58% choosing an IUD. Compare *id.* at 1293, with Guttmacher Institute, *Fact Sheet: Contraceptive Use in the United States* (Oct. 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.html (showing approximately 10% of all contraceptive users have IUDs as their method). As a result, among women in the study, the unintended pregnancy rate plummeted, and the abortion rate was less than half the regional and national rates. Colleen McNicholas et al., *The Contraceptive CHOICE Project Round Up*, 57 *Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology* 635 (Dec. 2014).

For these reasons, contraception is more than a service, device, or type of healthcare. Meaningful access to birth control is an essential element of women's constitutionally protected liberty. See *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (recognizing that sodomy laws do not simply regulate sex but infringe on the liberty rights of gays and lesbians). An exemption countenancing a religious objection to contraception suggests that religious objections are more important than women's equality in our society. Although our country has made great progress toward achieving

women's equality, more work is needed, and the contraception rule is a crucial step forward.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the judgment below.

Kate R. Cook, No. 99103
SUGARMAN ROGERS
101 Merrimac Street
Boston, MA 02114
cook@sugarmanrogers.com
(617) 619 3480

Brigitte Amiri
ACLU FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
bamiri@aclu.org
(212) 549 2500

September 24, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Jessie J. Rossman
Jessie J. Rossman, No. 1161236
Matthew R. Segal, No. 1151872
ACLU FOUNDATION
OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC.
211 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02111
jrossman@aclum.org
msegal@aclum.org
(617) 482 3170 ex 337

Counsel for Amici

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief complies with the typeface and type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Garamond, in 14-point type.

I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,437 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted under Rule 32(f), according to the count of Microsoft Word.

Dated: September 24, 2018

/s/ Jessie J. Rossman
Jessie J. Rossman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on September 24, 2018, the foregoing Amici Curiae Brief was filed electronically through the Court's CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system.

Dated: September 24, 2018

/s/ Jessie J. Rossman
Jessie J. Rossman

